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DEPT FOR SCA - PDAS MOON AND DAS KROL

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TAGS: [PGOV](#) [PREL](#) [MARR](#) [MOPS](#) [KG](#)

SUBJECT: MANAS: FM SARBAYEV MOVING FORWARD WITH PLAN, BUT
STRESSES IMPORTANCE OF PRESIDENTIAL PHONE CALLS TO BAKIYEV

REF: A. BISHKEK 462

[1](#)B. BISHKEK 459

[1](#)C. STATE 47934

[1](#)D. BISHKEK 452

[1](#)E. BISHKEK 443

[1](#)F. BISHKEK 429

[1](#)G. STATE 43050

Classified By: Ambassador Tatiana C. Gfoeller, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (S) Summary: The Ambassador met with Foreign Minister Sarbayev May 22 at her home. Sarbayev said that he had launched his plan to shape public and Parliamentary opinion on the Base, having placed stories on Afghanistan and Pakistan on state television and in the press. However, Sarbayev stressed that telephone calls from President Karzai and President Obama to Bakiyev as soon as possible were crucial to prevent his plan from being derailed. At this point, Sarbayev is keeping to his timetable of going before Parliament with the Manas agreements the fourth week of June, but he suggested that the telephone calls could speed the process. The Ambassador accepted an invitation to lunch with Sarbayev and Minister of Defense Kalyev on May 26. End Summary.

[1](#)2. (S) The Ambassador met with Kyrgyz Foreign Minister Kadyrbek Sarbayev at her residence on May 22. Repeating her earlier request, the Ambassador pressed for meetings with President Bakiyev and Minister of Defense Kalyev to discuss ratification of the signed agreements. Sarbayev said that it would not be "appropriate at this time" to see the President, but he would arrange a lunch with Kalyev for May 26.

[1](#)3. (S) Sarbayev said that he had begun his plan to get the agreements ratified by placing supportive items in the media. He noted recent features on the state television news about the deteriorating situation and fighting in Afghanistan and Pakistan and some print articles along the same lines. The Ambassador said that the Embassy was also working to place stories in the local media, and she gave the Foreign Minister a sheaf of additional articles that he could use, translated into Russian.

[1](#)4. (S) Pressed by the Ambassador to move up his planned public unveiling of the agreements, Sarbayev said that their plan was still to go public with the agreements around June 20 and then introduce the agreements in Parliament the following Monday, June 22. Parliament would discuss the agreements in committee on June 22 and 23, and then in the party faction meetings on June 24. At the plenary session on June 25, Sarbayev would present the case for ratification, and the Parliament would then act. (Comment: Sarbayev did not mention it, but one factor in their timing may be that the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Heads of State meeting will take place June 15-16 in Russia. End Note.)

¶15. (S) Sarbayev emphasized that the much-discussed Presidential telephone calls to Bakiyev were the key to the whole plan. Turning to a proposed call from President Karzai, Sarbayev said that he should be the point of contact for arranging the call, and he added that a letter from Karzai on the importance of Manas would also be helpful. (Note: Post has passed Sarbayev's direct contact information to Embassy Kabul, and Post understands that the Afghan Administration is ready to make the call in the "near future." End Note.)

¶16. (S) Sarbayev said, however, that it was "most important" for there to be a call from President Obama, and "nothing less" would be as useful in keeping momentum for the agreements. Pressed directly by the Ambassador on whether a phone call from anyone else in the Administration would be useful, he answered "No." Sarbayev felt strongly that with the Obama telephone call to Bakiyev his plan would work, and if the call were made soon, it might be possible to speed his plan's timetable. He added ruefully, "If we don't get a call before June 20, it will be much harder to make my plan work."

¶17. (S) In a one-on-one aside with the Ambassador, Sarbayev made clear that he had staked his job on ratifying the Manas agreements. He said that if his plan works, his own standing with Bakiyev would be increased, "and I will be able to advocate for you and your programs." If things fall through, however, "I will have to resign, and (the U.S.) will have no friends in the government." Sarbayev added that it was a "delicate time" in the country with the upcoming Presidential election on July 23. While Sarbayev was convinced that Bakiyev will win, he was concerned that the "circle around Bakiyev" was strongly pro-Russian. He concluded: "If the Manas agreements are approved, I will get such a boost in credibility that we will be able to get rid of the America-haters in his entourage. But if the agreements fail, their hand will be immeasurably strengthened."

¶18. (S) Comment: Sarbayev was absolutely clear that he needs help to move his "plan" forward and that he believes the telephone calls are key to the success of the plan. The Ambassador will seek further assurances from Minister of Defense Kalyev of continued support for the agreements and the plan for ratification when they lunch May 26.

GFOELLER